

The price of cyber (in)security: evidence from the Italian private sector

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Outline

- The cybersecurity data gap
- Data collection at the Bank of Italy
- Expenditure on security
- Frequency of attacks
- Cost of attacks
- Preliminary evidence on cyber insurance

The cybersecurity data gap (i)

- «[N]o point of cyberspace can be absolutely secure as long as cyber threats persist in the surrounding environment; our drive to strengthen the financial system against cyber attacks can achieve maximum results only if accompanied by measures that reduce the level of insecurity in cyberspace as a whole. In turn, **economy-wide policies** must be based on **reliable, impartial, comprehensive and widely accessible data**»



G7 finance ministers and central bank governors, final communiqué of the Bari meeting, May 2017

The cybersecurity data gap (ii)

- Major obstacle to policy design: lack of reliable, independent data
- Popular surveys on cyber attacks run by commercial entities (conflict of interest)



- OECD: lack of data significant issue in the design and pricing of insurance policies
- Official statistics on frequency and economic impact of cyber attacks only available in the UK (Cyber Security Breaches Survey since 2016)


Data collection at the Bank of Italy

- Bol business surveys: sample comprising about 4,000 industrial and non-financial services firms with 20 employees or more
 - statistically representative by macro-region, size class and certain aggregations of NACE Rev.2 sectors at the two-digit level
- Routinely used in academic research; data freely available through remote access portal; fully documented methodology
- First batch of cybersecurity questions in September 2016
- Topics covered so far:
 - defensive measures deployed
 - expenditure on security
 - frequency of attacks
 - cost of attacks
 - insurance uptake

Expenditure on security

- Relatively modest (overall median in 2016: €4,530, or 15 per cent of typical worker's annual gross wages)

Firms' expenditure on cyber defence, 2016
(percentages of firms; expenditure brackets in euros)



- High cross-sector variability: €19,080 for ICT firms, €3,420 for low-tech firms
- Cybersecurity training and vulnerability analysis more popular than encryption. Vendor-driven market?

Frequency of attacks

Share of Italian manufacturing and non-financial services firms hit by at least one cyber attack that imparted damage, September 2015-September 2016


	<i>Original data</i>	<i>Imputed data</i>
Geographical area		
<i>North-West</i>	28.5	44.2
<i>North-East</i>	32.5	47.3
<i>Centre</i>	35.3	52.3
<i>South and Islands</i>	24.4	35.9
Number of employees		
<i>20 – 49</i>	29.2	42.7
<i>50 – 199</i>	31.3	48.4
<i>200 – 499</i>	36.7	56.0
<i>500 and over</i>	34.8	62.8
Tech / knowledge intensity		
<i>High and medium-high</i>	30.5	48.8
<i>Low and medium-low</i>	30.1	43.8
Exports as share of turnover		
<i>Less than 1/3</i>	29.4	43.0
<i>Between 1/3 and 2/3</i>	34.6	51.8
<i>Over 2/3</i>	29.0	48.5
Total	30.2	45.2

Cost of attacks

- Large majority <€10,000, 1 per cent >€50,000
- 70 per cent report business interruption and r&r working hours

Monetary costs of all cyber attacks suffered in 2016, at the firm level

(percentages of firms that reported an attack; cost brackets in euros)




- We know from other sources that large incidents exist, but the sample is not geared towards tail events
- Large incidents are key in quantifying impact on economy: research project for 2018

Insurance (i)

Prevalence of cyber insurance, by technological intensity of activity sector, September 2017
(share of firms)

	No	Yes, stand-alone	Yes, part of broader policy
<i>ICT</i>	59.3	13.5	27.2
<i>High-tech, non-ICT</i>	78.2	7.2	14.6
<i>Low-tech</i>	81.5	4.8	13.7
Total	79.8	5.7	14.5

Reasons for not buying cyber insurance, September 2017
(share of uninsured firms)



Insurance (ii)

- 12.9 per cent of firms in the universe were interested in insurance, yet didn't have any coverage
- Rationing and adverse selection are a possibility:
 - *firms that reported an attack in previous surveys were less likely than others to have insurance, but more likely to have investigated possibilities without finding a solution*
 - *attack history, however, is not guaranteed to be a good proxy of risk, as victimization has been shown to incentivize security investment*

Thank you for your attention!